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THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF AMERICAN LAWYERS 
 
Adam Bonica,* Adam S. Chilton,* and Maya Sen* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The ideology of American lawyers has been a persistent source of discussion and debate. Two 
obstacles, however, have prevented this topic from being systematically studied: the sheer 
number of attorneys in the United States and the need for a methodology that makes 
comparing the ideology of specific individuals possible. In this paper, we present a 
comprehensive mapping of lawyers’ ideologies that has overcome these hurdles. We use a 
new dataset that links the largest database of political ideology with the largest database of 
lawyers’ identities to complete the most extensive analysis of the political ideology of 
American lawyers ever conducted.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Reflecting on the role of lawyers in the early American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville 
famously wrote, “[i]n America there are no nobles or men of letters, and the people is apt to 
mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class, and the most 
cultivated circle of society” (de Tocqueville 1840, 514). Noting their political influence, he 
further observed that, “[i]f I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply 
without hesitation that it is not composed of the rich, who are united together by no common 
tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.” 
Nearly two centuries later, de Tocqueville’s observations have largely remained accurate 
(Posner 2009). In the 113th Congress, 156 of the 435 members of the House of 
Representatives and 55 out of the 100 Senators elected were lawyers (Manning 2014). 
Moreover, 25 out of 43 Presidents have been lawyers (Slater 2008). Turning to state executive 
positions, 24 out of the current 50 state governors have law degrees.1 In addition being heavily 
overrepresented in elected branches of government, lawyers have the privilege of exclusively 
occupying an entire branch of government. All state high court justices are former lawyers, 
and 32 states explicitly require that their high court justices be former lawyers (Barton 2014, 
30). All judges currently serving on the federal courts are lawyers, as are all nine justices 
sitting on the Supreme Court. 
The influence of the nation’s bar extends from elected politics into policy making and 
beyond. For example, by some counts, 8 percent of the nation’s lawyers work in government 
(American Bar Association 2012). Lawyers are also heavily overrepresented among Fortune 
500 CEOs and CFOs (Wecker 2012). Within academia, law schools occupy the “crown jewel” 
positions at universities such as Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, and UCLA, with large law faculty 
and revenue generating streams (Winterhalter 2013).  
Moreover, the American Bar Association has nearly 400,000 members, making it one of 
the largest advocacy organizations in the country—behind only the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science in terms of total number of members (American Bar Association 
2015). The ABA is also one of the largest and most powerful lobbying groups in the United 
States. 
                                                
1 Based the biographies of all sitting American governors from Wikipedia on February 6, 2015. 
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Given the importance of lawyers in American public life, the ideologies of lawyers is a 
constant a source of discussion and debate among both academics and journalists. For 
example, commentators often discuss whether law firms are liberal or conservative based on 
the reputations of a few prominent partners, or—in the most comprehensive analysis prior to 
this study of the ideology of law firms—based on donations to two candidates in a single 
election (Muller 2013). Similarly, the ideologies of law schools have been examined using 
proxies like the breakdown of judges that law students clerk for after graduation (Roeder 
2014). As these examples illustrate, the evidence used to study the ideology of American 
lawyers has mostly been anecdotal or incomplete, and systematic scholarship has remained 
elusive. 
These analyses have remained limited for two reasons. The first reason is that, given the 
massive number of attorneys in the United States, any study of the legal profession as a whole 
is a daunting task. With more than 1.1 million law school graduates in America (Brown 
2013), conducting a compressive analysis of even simple data—addresses, law school 
attended, practice area, etc.—has been beyond the reach of even sophisticated quantitative 
scholars. The second reason is methodological: a systematic analysis of the legal profession 
requires developing a way to place individuals on a single, easily comparable ideological 
dimension. 
We address both of these issues by relying on a new dataset that links the most 
comprehensive database of political ideology with the most comprehensive database of 
lawyers’ identities. Our data on ideological leanings is from the Database on Ideology, Money 
in Politics, and Elections (DIME). The DIME data leverages the vast number of federal 
campaign contributions made by individuals. By scaling not just whom the contributions were 
made to, but also by what amount, the DIME data can be used to assess an individual’s 
ideological leaning. Our data on the identity of American lawyers is from the Martindale-
Hubbell Legal Directory. Martindale-Hubbell provides the “most comprehensive database of 
lawyers in the country.”2 By linking the DIME data with the Martindale-Hubbell Legal 
Directory, we therefore have access to the largest and most comprehensive dataset ever 
amassed on the ideological leanings of the legal profession. 
                                                
2 See LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, available at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Martindale-
Hubbell+Law+Directory (last visited January 31, 2015). 
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We use this combined data to explore the ideology of American lawyers in five ways. 
First, we tackle the question of the ideological leanings of the legal profession taken as a 
whole. Second, we consider the relationship between geography and the ideology of lawyers. 
Third, we examine the relationship between lawyers’ educational backgrounds and ideology. 
Fourth, we explore how ideology varies across firms and within firms. Fifth, we look at the 
ideologies of lawyers by practice area.  
We proceed in this article as follows. In PART I, we motivate our inquiry by expanding on 
our observations about the importance of the bar and by discussing existing studies that 
examine its ideological positioning. PART II begins the discussion of the two datasets that we 
use in the analysis, which are (1) the DIME database of campaign contributions for 
ideological data and (2) the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. This section is more technical 
and explains how the two databases were linked with each other, as well as possible sources 
of bias. In PART III, we present our basic findings regarding the overall ideological 
distribution of attorneys. In the following sections, we disaggregate the legal profession 
further. PART IV disaggregates the ideology of lawyers by their geographic location. PART V 
analyzes the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by their educational experience. PART VI 
presents the ideology of lawyers by the law firms where they work. PART VII explores the 
ideology of lawyers by their practice area.  
 
I. STUDYING THE IDEOLOGY OF LAWYERS 
 
We start with the broad issue of the importance of the bar and its role in American politics 
and society. We explore these issues in this section by examining existing studies that have 
looked at the ideological composition of the bar. In so doing, we note that much research on 
this point has suffered from an absence of clear, comprehensive data. We therefore devote 
some attention in this section to explaining how ideological measures have been developed in 
this literature as well as in other fields. 
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A. What We Know About Ideology and the Bar 
 
Despite their political importance, we know relatively little about the ideologies of 
American lawyers. It is worth contrasting this with how much scholars do know about other 
politically important groups. For example, there is a generally accurate consensus that 
Congress tilts to the political left or to the political right depending on electoral outcomes and 
the public opinion milieu. In fact, scholars have been able to determine these ideological 
leanings very accurately and in a dynamic fashion, enabling us to compare the ideologies of 
different Congressional sessions and of individual Congressional representatives and 
Presidents (see, e.g., Carroll et al. 2009; Poole & Rosenthal 2007; Bailey 200; and Poole et al. 
1997). When it comes to the media, statistical studies too have quantified political leanings, 
showing that some news organization are more or less liberal or conservative in their 
representation of the news (see, e.g., Barberá & Sood 2014; Groseclose & Milyo 2005). More 
recent work has begun untangling how the public’s ideology varies by jurisdiction; for 
example, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) develop estimation techniques that rely on public 
opinion survey data and that place localities on an ideological scale. Perhaps most apropos to 
the work we do here, research by Bonica has used campaign contribution data to open up the 
estimation of ideologies across different professions (Bonica 2014). For example, Bonica et 
al. (2014) looked at the ideologies of the medical profession, finding that some specialties 
lean more to the left and others more to the right. Given that the American Medical 
Association is a powerful lobbying and professional organization, understanding the 
ideologies of doctors gives some insight into the potential lobbying and policy priorities made 
by that organization. Taken together, this literature is indicative of significant scholarly 
advances into the exploration of American ideologies, both of the American public and also of 
American political and professional elites. 
However, substantially less is known about the politics of the nation’s lawyers. Instead, 
the scholarship that does exist focuses on specific aspects of lawyers’ ideology and fails to 
provide a comprehensive picture of the profession as a whole. For example, within the 
scholarly literature, some have approached the question via the lens of judicial selection. Most 
recently, Bonica and Sen (2015) posit that since the nation’s judges are drawn from the 
nation’s pool of attorneys, they must somewhat reflective of lawyer ideology. They instead 
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find that lawyers tilt to the left, while judges tilt to the right. However, because Bonica and 
Sen (2015) primarily explore judicial politics, despite using data similar to the data used in 
this study, they do not explore lawyers’ ideology specifically.  
Additional writing on these issues comes from members of the press and other public 
commentators—particularly when the questions turn to the influence of the bar on national 
politics. Many conservative commentators have made the point that lawyers—particularly 
trial lawyers—appear more liberal than the rest of the population. For example, Trial 
Lawyers, Inc., put together an online report with the aim of “shedding light on the size, scope 
and inner workings of America’s lawsuit industry,” put forth data on trial lawyers and their 
practices. The report comments that: 
 
[I]n the 2002 electoral cycle, members of Williams & Bailey, one of the largest 
personal-injury firms in Texas, gave $2.4 million to federal campaigns; lawyers at 
securities class action giant Milberg Weiss gave $1.4 million; Baron & Budd, headed by 
former ATLA president and asbestos class action lawyer Fred Baron, accounted for $1.1 
million; and prominent asbestos and tobacco litigator Peter Angelos’s firm gave $1.9 
million. Each of these firms’ members gave at least 99% of their contributions to 
Democrats. All told, the litigation industry has contributed $470 million to federal 
campaigns since 1990. [Emphasis Added] 
 
These observations spill over into critiques of the Democratic Party for siding 
overwhelmingly with the interest of the bar and of trial lawyers. Citing the Trial Lawyers Inc. 
study, a 2010 editorial in The Washington Times complained that these liberal ties are 
intimately related to liberal-leaning policies, arguing that “the main reason Democrats don’t 
include lawsuit reform in their health care proposals is that they are afraid of angering the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers. And bill after bill after bill in the Democratic Congress, on a bewildering 
variety of issues, contain hidden provisions that would further enrich those attorneys.”3 In a 
more scholarly and systematic analysis of Congressional House votes in which “litigious 
policy was the main matter of dispute,” Burke (2004, 188) finds that Democrats “voted for the 
                                                
3 Why Liberals Are Lawyers’ Puppets, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/16/why-liberals-are-lawyers-puppets/. 
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pro-litigation side on an average of 67 percent of the votes” and “Republicans 17 percent.” In 
addition, on several of the votes, “the litigious policy under review served Democratic 
objectives and so received the vast majority of Democratic votes.” Burke concludes that it was 
“an ideological struggle, in which liberals typically favored litigious policies and 
conservatives opposed them.” 
Taken together, these scholarly and journalistic accounts paint a picture of a liberal-
leaning bar. However, a limiting factor in all of these analyses appears to be data availability. 
This is understandable: it is difficult enough to accurately capture individual ideology and all 
but impossible to do so on a scale massive enough to capture (even a share of) the population 
of over one million attorneys in the United States. We therefore turn to a more thorough 
discussion of the methodological issues involved and how the measures used here fit into this 
broader literature. 
 
B. Methodological Approaches to Ideology 
 
The first hurdle to developing a comprehensive picture of the ideology of American 
lawyers is developing a methodology that allows for the comparison of ideologies across 
individuals. This requires having a way to compare the ideology of specific individuals even if 
they have not voted on the same issues (the way that members of Congress do on legislation 
or Supreme Court Justices do on cases) and even if they have not donated money to political 
candidates in the same election cycle. Although there have not been prior efforts to develop 
methods to study the ideology of lawyers specifically, thinking through ways to rigorously 
measure ideology generally has been one of the major projects of political scientists over the 
last several decades. A great deal can thus be gained by leveraging the insights that have been 
developed in those other areas. To do so, it is worth beginning with the area where the 
measurement of ideology has been primarily developed: the United States Congress. 
Scholars have devised several mechanisms by which to estimate the ideologies of 
Congressional actors. The most well known of the mechanisms is DW-NOMINATE scores 
(Poole et al. 2011; Poole & Rosenthal 1997). Under the assumptions that representatives and 
Senators cast votes that are close to their true ideological positioning, the DW-NOMINATE 
methodology leverages Congressional roll call votes across different issues to measure 
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ideology of individuals. The method uses the roll-call votes of Members of Congress to 
collapse ideology into two dimensions: one is believed to be regarding economic issues and 
the other is believed to be regarding social or racial issues. These two dimensions appear to go 
quite far in explaining variance in Congressional votes. 
One methodological issue in estimating these sorts of votes is that Congressional 
representatives need to be compared to each other. That is, viewing Representative Barney 
Frank’s (D-MA) votes in isolation is meaningless when trying to understand his relative 
ideology. We can only obtain information about Frank’s ideological positioning once we 
compare his voting record with other representatives—for example, to those of 
Representatives John Boehner (R-OH). That is, we need multiple representatives to cast votes 
on the same issue. Lacking this information means that we must search for a bridge to 
compare people against each other. For example, given that Frank retired in 2007, we can still 
use votes that he cast along with Boehner, and then use Boehner (and others like him) as a 
bridge to compare Frank’s record with those of his successors (with whom he did not 
overlap). 
This strategy of “bridging” means that actors from various institutions—for example, the 
Senate and the House, or the 113th House and the 110th House—can be placed ideologically 
on a single scale (see, e.g., Bailey 2007). Denoted in the literature as the Common Space 
Scores, these consistently scaled scores allow political scientists to compare political actors 
across various branches of government. This basic insight—that bridging enables the 
comparison of individual ideology across time periods and institutions—provides the rough 
blueprint for how it can be possible to measure the ideology of American lawyers. 
 
C. Methodological Approaches to Ideology in a Legal Context 
 
Lawyers present specific challenges when it comes to estimating ideology. So far, 
academics studying the ideology of lawyers have focused on estimating judicial ideology; 
most notably, the ideologies of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. There are three reasons for this. 
First, for many the Supreme Court represents the pinnacle of the American legal system and 
certainly attracts the most attention from members of the press and the public. Second, as 
many have observed, ideological rifts are becoming more and more palpable (Devins & Baum 
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2014). Third, and perhaps most importantly from a methodological perspective, the Supreme 
Court sits as an en banc panel of nine judges. This allows scholars to compare, for example, 
how Antonin Scalia has voted on the same set of cases as Ruth Bader Ginsburg. There are 
consequently fewer obstacles in bridging ideologies because all nine Justices (or some subset 
thereof) hear the same set of cases. 
The literature here is well developed. For example, in an influential paper Martin and 
Quinn (2002) developed flexible scores that take into account not only the Justices’ relative 
voting compared to each other, but also how their relative ideologies could change over time. 
These Martin-Quinn scores have shown that Justices fluctuate in important ways over the 
course of their careers, that certain Justices tend to occupy the important “median” Justice 
position, and that Court rulings can reliably be predicted on the basis of little else besides the 
Justices’ Martin-Quinn scores. Of course, Martin-Quinn scores are not the only measures of 
Supreme Court ideology. For example, Segal and Cover (1989) have developed scores that 
rely on newspaper editorials and other writings at the time of nomination, pinpointing the 
then-candidate’s (1) qualifications in tandem with their (2) perceived ideology. These scores 
have been further combined with DW-NOMINATE scores and re-scaled to test additional 
theories of judicial behavior (Cameron & Park 2009). Additionally, new research takes 
voting-based ideological measurements and combines them with issue-area voting and text 
analysis (Lauderdale & Clark 2014; Bailey 2013). An attractive property of these analyses is 
that they combine substantive knowledge of legal issue areas and salience with text-based 
estimation. These studies show that Justices’ ideologies vary not just over time, but also 
across different kinds of legal questions. 
The Supreme Court, however, presents an idiosyncratic example within the law. Not only 
do all nine Justices (usually) hear cases together, but the fact that vacancies are staggered 
means that we usually have a solid base on which to “bridge” ideologies across natural courts. 
The absence of these two features becomes a roadblock when we turn to the ideologies of 
lower-court judges or lawyers where there is no bridging to be done. Thus, for lower-court 
appointments—including judges serving on courts such as the Federal Courts of Appeals—a 
more common strategy for determining judicial ideology is to rely on the DW-NOMINATE 
score of the appointing actor. This is usually operationalized by using the DW-NOMINATE 
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score of either the appointing President or, in the case where the President and the Senator(s) 
of the home state are of the same party, the DW-NOMINATE score of the senior Senator (or 
some combination of the two) (Epstein et al. 2007). However, these measures assume that 
ideologies across judges are constant—a fairly implausible assumption. 
For state court judges, the question becomes even more difficult, as the “identity” of the 
appointing actors is a state-by-state patchwork of direct elections, appointments, and elections 
plus appointments. In this context, the dominant measure of state judge ideology is the PAJID 
scores developed in Hall, Brace, and Langer (2000). These scores rely on a combination of 
elite ideological scores combined with public ideology measures. More recently, Bonica and 
Sen (2015) and Bonica and Woodruff (2015) have made advancements on these measures 
using the DIME data that we also rely on here. 
When it comes to the ideology of individuals neither elected nor appointed to any kind of 
public office, a common strategy used to estimate the ideologies of these actors has been to 
examine campaign contributions. The logic of this approach is that contributions are likely 
made to ideological allies. Using this method, McGinnis et al. (2005) examined campaign 
contributions made by law professors and found that they are overwhelmingly made to left-
leaning political actors. More recently, Chilton and Posner (2015) found that law professors’ 
political contributions predict the ideological leanings of their scholarship. 
Although using campaign contributions as a proxy for ideology makes it possible to study 
individuals who are neither judges nor legislators, it is worth noting that concerns have been 
raised with this approach. Perhaps the primary concern is the possibility of strategic 
donation—that is, donations that are made strategically for career purposes or for other kinds 
of non-ideological reasons. We will consider this possibility, as well as other concerns, below 
as we explain the data we use here and how our measures were developed. 
 
II. DATA & METHODS 
 
The findings that we present in this paper stem from a fruitful combination of two existing 
data sources: (A) the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) and (B) 
the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. We discuss each in turn and then explain how we link 
the two databases together. While doing so, we pay specific attention to the challenges raised 
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by problems with missing data, selection effects, and strategic giving.4 
 
A. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) 
 
As we noted in the previous section, calculating individual ideologies is not only difficult 
but requires a massive data collection effort. We therefore use a recently developed data 
source called the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), maintained 
by Stanford University (Bonica 2013a). DIME started with the premise of collecting and 
standardizing contributions made to campaigns and then ultimately disclosed under FEC laws. 
As with other studies that examine campaign contributions data, the logic behind DIME is that 
an individual will “put his money where his mouths is.” That is, we can reasonably expect that 
an individual will contribute financial funds toward a political candidate, PAC, or other kind 
of political entity that represents his or her political beliefs. Furthermore, we can also logically 
expect that the target of donations will be more like their donors—that is, an entity like the 
NRA will ideologically be aligned with its many donors and vice versa. In addition, we 
further expect that it is not simply the target of the funds, but also the amount, that reflects 
underlying ideology (within FEC campaign contributions limits). For example, we might 
think that a $2,000 contribution to Barack Obama indicates at a stronger connection with 
Obama’s ideological positioning than would, say, a $5 contribution to Obama. Thus, 
contributions can be thought of having both a direction (in terms of the identity of the 
contributor and recipient) and also a scale (in terms of the amount). 
Although the machinery of this estimation strategy is described in more technical detail 
elsewhere (Bonica 2014), a brief orientation is merited. DIME takes the campaign 
contributions data and rescales them by analyzing distances between various points. The key 
contribution of the analysis is that it takes contributions data and rescales them into a single, 
unidimensional scale that comports roughly with the standard common space score scale. 
These “CFscores” range from -2 to 2. That is, from highly negative (which corresponds to 
increased liberalness) to highly positive (which corresponds to increased conservativeness). 
CFscores are also reported for any individual who has made a campaign contribution from 
1979 to 2012, representing some “51,572 candidates and 6,408 political committees as 
                                                
4 For additional technical details, see Bonica & Sen (2015), Bonica & Woodruff (2015), and Bonica (2014). 
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recipients and 13.7 million individuals and 1.3 million organizations as donors” (Bonica 
2013b). This means that nearly 5% of the U.S. population is captured in the DIME data. 
A potential source of concern could be that some donations are made strategically—that 
is, that individuals could be making contributions in ways that are fundamentally unrelated to 
their ideological views.5 This is particularly a concern for those individuals who aspire to 
occupy a higher office or who view political support as a strategic tool to another position or 
for personal advancement. While this concern is legitimate, we note that several factors 
counsel against this substantially biasing our results (particularly when we consider the size of 
the sample involved). The first is that strategic giving is likely a concern primarily for those 
who have the most to gain—like those involved in political aspects of the legal system. That 
is, making a strategic choice in giving might influence how judges, prosecutors, and lawyers 
interested in pursing political office decide to contribute. Although this is a sizeable number 
of lawyers, it is still fairly small compared to the overall number of lawyers. Second, even 
focusing in on this group, the CFscores are robust to factors known in the political science 
literature to be related to strategic giving—such as potentially strategic giving to those 
candidates who are more likely to win (Bonica 2014, 373-76). Third, when we constrain the 
sample to only examine those who both receive and make contributions (e.g., political actors 
who are eligible to receive campaign contributions), we find that the CFscores calculated 
using either contributions received or contributions made yield the same inferences. Taken 
together, these factors counsel against the presumption that strategic giving substantially 
biases the analyses that we present here. Instead, we believe that the DIME database provides 
the best possible source of reliable data for studying the ideology of American lawyers. 
 
B. Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory 
 
DIME provides a wealth of data relating to Americans’ political ideologies. It does not, 
however, allow us to identify attorneys or members of the legal profession. Our next task is 
therefore to try to uncover the identities of American attorneys. This is no small feat. To our 
knowledge, no national database is kept by the Amrican Bar Association or any other 
professional organization. In addition, although many states keep good records of individuals 
                                                
5 Concerns about strategic giving are discussed at length in Bonica (2014) and Bonica & Woodruff (2015). 
Additionally, Bonica & Sen (2015) provide additional discussion of this issue in the context of judicial ideology. 
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who are licensed to practice law in their state, no such national databases exists. 
Although it is far from perfect, our solution is to turn to private databases for this 
information. Specifically, we use the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory. Founded in 1868, 
the purpose of the Martindale-Hubbell directory was to centralize lawyers’ information and 
make it more accessible for clients and private individuals looking for legal representation. 
Although the advent of the Internet has somewhat obviated the need for the Martindale-
Hubbell database, the directory still contains thousands of entries, spanning all 50 states and 
practice areas. Given the lack of a national lawyers database, many legal scholars and 
journalists have cited the Martindale-Hubbell database as being one of the more 
comprehensive directories of American lawyers (see, e.g., Whisner 2015; Young 2008). 
All entries included in the Martindal-Hubbell directory contain some basic information. 
This includes the lawyer’s (1) name, (2) professional address, (3) bar state and admission date, 
(3) law school attended, and (4) employer type. In addition, nearly all of the listings also 
include (5) name of law office/firm or employer, (6) position/professional title (e.g., partner or 
associate), (7) undergraduate institution, and (8) specialty/practice areas. Additionally, a 
significant percentage of listings included even more information voluntarily provided by the 
lawyer, such as (9) detailed employment history, (10) judicial clerkships along with the name 
of the judge, (11) lists of prominent clients, and (12) prominent cases argued. Since some 
lawyers choose to provide more information and others do not, these last four items are 
incomplete sources of information.6 Furthermore, each listing includes each lawyer’s 
International Standard Bar Number (ISBN), which is assigned by the American Bar 
Association and remains the same over the course of a lawyer’s career. This helps assuage 
concerns that a single lawyer could have multiple entries (and therefore be biasing our 
findings).  
One caveat to relying on the Martindale-Hubbell database is the possibility of missingness 
in the data. To our knowledge, no comprehensive study has explored the completeness of the 
data contained or collected in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Thus, we do not know 
whether the directory systematically underreports or whether some lawyers are more likely to 
                                                
6 When available, our record-linkage algorithm referenced these last items as a way to augment our 
matching algorithm. However, we do not include any information from items (9) through (12) in the main 
analysis. 
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allow their information to be posted publicly. If data were missing in this way, it could 
possibily bias in some of our findings. For example, it could be the case that more 
conservative lawyers routinely eschew or disallow their informaton to be posted. If this were 
the case, then our analysis would indicate a liberal bias among the bar even though no bias in 
fact exists. A similar pattern could be observed if it were the case that individuals avoided 
publishing their details for reasons that are superficially non-ideological but still vary 
systematically according to ideology. 
Despite these concerns, for the most part, we believe that attorneys in private practice are 
unlikely to opt against being listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. However, we do note 
that this incentive might not be constant across all practice areas. For example, attorneys who 
operate within the criminal justice system—for example, public defenders or prosectors—
might have less of a need keep their information in the Martindale-Hubbell directory updated. 
Lastly, we note that Martindale-Hubbell does not include in its database those who attended 
law school but never took the bar exam (in other words, individuals who could perhaps be 
considered part of the legal profession even if they are not a practicing attorney). We have no 
reason to believe that this would covary with ideology in a way that would substantially bias 
our results, but this is an important caveat to our analyses. 
 
C. Linking DIME to Martindale-Hubbell 
 
Our next task was to link these two databases—that is, to locate the corresponding 
CFscore for the Martindale-Hubbell entries. More technical details of the approach are 
described in Bonica and Sen (2015), but this quick overview will describe our method 
generally. To link the two databases, we programmed an algorithm to locate and pair up 
individuals who were located in both databases. 
The algorithm worked as follows. First, the program scanned the DIME records to identify 
donors who are listed as attorneys—either via (1) self-identification as attorneys, lawyers, 
etc., (2) identification of their employer as a recognized law firm or a company or 
organization identified as “law office,” “LLP,” etc., or (3) self-identification with a suffix 
such as “Esq.,” “J.D.,” etc.7 Second, the algorithm then used this information to search the 
                                                
7 Records with titles associated with paralegals or office clerks were screened out. 
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Martindale-Hubbell directory to search for possible matches, comparing (1) first, last, and 
middle names, (2) suffix or title, (3) address (city, state, and zip codes), (4) firm or employer, 
and (5) geographic proximity. The matching algorithm was deliberately calibrated to be “less 
greedy” so as to minimize the probability of false matches (e.g., including people who were 
not attorneys). This was a choice we made so mimize the likelihood of systematic bias at the 
expense of possibly introducing random noise. 
We also relied on the Martindale-Hubbell directory information for practice area; these 
were compiled from written descriptions provided in each individual’s listing. Since these 
lacked structured categeorization, we grouped them into a more general set of distinct 
categories using automated content analyses techniques. We also note that Martindale-
Hubbell includes some additionally potentially useful information. For example, many 
attorneys in private practice listed notable or important clients in their profiles. However, 
because these sorts of data were provided apparently at the request of the profiled attorney and 
not all attorneys provided such data (or did so in a consistent fashion), we did not use them in 
our analysis. 
Again, we note that one potential area of concern here is selection bias—in this context, 
the possibility that some attorneys may appear in one database but not the other. For example, 
some attorneys may be active legal professionals but not active campaign contributors. This 
would mean they would be absent from the DIME database and have no corresponding 
CFscore. Such a scenario raises concerns not just for the study of lawyers’ ideologies using 
DIME, but more broadly for DIME’s use in other contexts (see, e.g., Bonica, Rosenthal, & 
Rothman 2014). Fortunately, attorneys are extremely active contributors: 422,362 attorneys in 
Martindale-Hubbell were also listed in DIME. This corresponds to a donation rate of 
approximately 43.4%. 
Although this giving rate is very high—about ten times higher than the general U.S. 
population—it could be the case that those attorneys who donate differ systematically from 
those who do not. To test for this possibility, we performed several additional analyses that 
take into account the probability that an attorney identified in Martindale-Hubbell also 
appeared in DIME, comparing the results using selection corrections with results that do not 
use such corrections. Although those results are not presented here, they show that the 
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substantive inferences associated with a larger or smaller CFscore are substantively identical 
when using a selection model versus not using one. We therefore move forward noting that 
many concerns should be mitigated by (a) the extremely high donor share in the population 
and (b) the fact that selection models show substantively similar results to what we present 
here.8 
 
III. BASIC DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS’ IDEOLOGIES 
 
We now turn to exploring the basic data structure and patterns for the overall population 
of American lawyers. We do so in three parts. First, we present data on the overall distribution 
of the ideology of American lawyers. Second, we put this information in context by showing 
the distribution of lawyers’ ideology in comparison to other well-educated professions. Third, 
we go further in depth by showing how various factors—like gender, experience, and practice 
type—predict the ideology of American lawyers. 
 
A. Overall Distribution of Lawyers’ Ideology 
 
Figure 1 displays the ideological distribution of all American lawyers, oriented from most 
liberal (negative on the CFscore scale) to most conservative (positive on the CFscore scale).9 
The histogram bars here—and in subsequent figures presented in the paper—represent 
frequencies. Taller bars mean that more lawyers fall within a given ideology, and shorter bars 
mean that fewer lawyers fall within a given ideology. 
To ground the discussion and to provide additional context, Figure 1 includes the 
CFscores of several well-known political figures. On the far left is Alan Grayson—a 
Congressman from Florida know for his outspoken liberal views. On the far right is Ron 
Paul—a former presidential candidate and Congressman from Texas known for his libertarian 
positions. The political figures placed in between include Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Hilary 
                                                
8 Additional analyses that we do not report indicate that some traits are linked with a higher probability of 
being identified in the DIME database. These include, for example, an attorney being older, male, and being a 
partner (as opposed to an associate). If anything, these are traits that lead to attorneys being more likely to be 
conservative. Because the data shows that lawyers tend to be liberal, this means that, if anything, we are 
underestimating the degree of liberal bias in the attorney population. A fuller test of selection bias via Heckman 
selection corrections can be found in Bonica & Sen (2015). 
9 A total of 395,254 lawyers are included in Figure 1. The reason that the full 422,362 set of lawyers in our 
dataset are not included in Figure 1 is that we excluded lawyers who only gave to corporate or trade groups. For 
more informaiton on this decision, see Bonica & Sen (2015). 
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Clinton, Chris Christie, and Mitt Romney. 
 
Figure 1: Overall Distribution of Lawyers’ Ideology 
 
Figure 1 reveals four important facts about the ideology of American laywers. First, 
American lawyers lean to the left of the ideological spectrum. To help place this in context, 
the mean DIME score among the attorney population is -0.31 compared to -0.05 for the entire 
population of donors. Moreover, some 62% of the sample of attorneys are positioned to the 
left of the midpoint between the party means for members of Congress. Morover, the modal 
CFscore is in the center-left. This places the average American lawyer’s ideology close to the 
ideology of Bill Clinton. To be more precise, the modal CFscore for American lawyers is -
0.52 and Bill Clinton’s CFscore is -0.68. This confirms prior scholarship and journalism that 
has argued that the legal profession is liberal on balance. To our knowledge, however, this 
figure represents the most comprehensive picture of the ideology of American lawyers ever 
assembled. 
Second, although American lawyers lean to the left, there is a (slight) bimodality to the 
distribution. Although there is certainly a peak of observations located around the center-left, 
there is also a second, smaller peak in the center-right. In other words, the ideology of 
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American lawyers peaks around Bill Clinton on the left and around Mitt Romeny on the right. 
Third, there is a relative scarcity of observations at both ends of the ideology spectrum. As 
Figure 1 clearly shows, very few lawyers are as far left as Alan Grayson or as far right as Ron 
Paul. This, of course, does not mean that there are no lawyers who hold extreme ideological 
views. In fact, Alan Grayson is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and Michelle Bachmann is 
a gradaute of the O.W. Coburn School of Law. 
Fourth, although the fact that few American lawyers hold extreme ideological positions 
may suggest that lawyers are generally moderate, it is worth noting that there are relatively 
few lawyers in the middle of the distribution. In fact, there are fewer lawyers who have an 
ideology around Olympia Snowe (a former Senator from Maine known for her centrism) than 
there are around Bernie Sanders (a Senator from Vermont known for being very liberal) or 
Paul Ryan (a Congressman from Wisconsin known for being very conservative). 
 
B. Comparing Lawyers to Other Well Educated Professionals 
 
Although Figure 1 presents how the distribution of the ideology of lawyers compares to 
the ideology of prominent political figures, it is difficut to know exactly how to interpret that 
information without understanding how other professions fare on this same scale. In order to 
provide more context to the ideology of lawyers, we present the same information alongside 
the distributions for donors from other well-educated professions in Figure 2. The six other 
groups of professionals we include here are technology workers; journalists; academics; 
accountants; bankers and financial workers; and medical doctors.10 
Figure 2 orders the professions from most liberal (technology workers) to most 
conservative (medical doctors). Most obviously, the data presented in Figure 2 shows that 
there is substantial ideological heterogeneity in the donor populations across these seven 
professions. That is to say, there are well-educated professions—like journalism—that skew 
to the left, and there are well-educated professions—like medicine—that skew to the right. 
 
 
                                                
10 All professional information was scraped from the DIME database. That is, the information on an 
individual’s profession was taken from that individual’s campaign contributions disclosure forms. For additional 
information on this process, as well as robustness checks, see Bonica (2014). 
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Figure 2: Overall Distribution of Well-Educated Professions 
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Figure 2 also reveals two facts about the ideology of American lawyers that are worth 
noting. First, the ideological distribution of lawyers falls exactly in the middle of these seven 
professions. The distributions for technology workers, journalists, and academics are skewed 
further to the left. This perhaps confirms existing beliefs about the types of individuals who 
are attracted to these professions (see, e.g., Mariani and Hewitt 2008). Lawyers as a whole are 
much more liberal, however, than three of the professions presented. Indeed, the median 
lawyer is well to the left of the respective medians for accountants; bankers and financial 
workers; and medical doctors. The difference between those in the legal profession and those 
in the banking or finance industry is particularly revealing, as corporate law firms and finance 
firms tend to be centered in comparable metropolitan areas and perhaps draw from the same 
underlying pools of potential candidates.11 
Second, a smaller percentage of lawyers are at the extreme end of the ideological spectrum 
compared to the other professions shown in Figure 2. For example, technology workers, 
journalists, and academics are all professions with a sizable percentage of members with a 
CFscore of less than -1.0. The legal profession on the other hand, albeit liberal overall, has a 
much lower percentage of outlier members who are extremely liberal or extremely 
conservative. 
 
C. Comparing Lawyers Across Other Characteristics 
 
We now turn to examining our subset of lawyers more closely via a simple regression 
analysis. Figure 3 graphically presents a regression using a number of important 
characteristics of each lawyer to estimate that individual’s CFscore. The outcome variable—
the individual’s CFscore—is stylized so that a greater value corresponds with the individual 
being more conservative. The sample for this regression includes all those individuals from 
whom we could reliably extract both the CFscore as well as these various characteristics.12 
 
 
                                                
11 These differences are demonstrated to be significant using a series of Kolmorov-Smirnov tests, which 
check that the shape of the distributions are more different than would be expected due to chance (Bonica & Sen 
2015). 
12 To be more exact, there are 393,240 observations included in this regression. 
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Figure 3: Results of Regression Estimating Lawyers’ Ideology 
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In Figure 3, each row represents a different variable included in the regression. The 
specific variables that we included in this regression are: (1) gender; (2) the number of years 
since the individual was admitted to the bar; (3) whether the individual is identified as a 
government lawyer, (4) in-house counsel, (5) Big Law practitioner, (6) solo practitioner, (7) a 
partner in a law firm, (8) a prosecutor or defense attorney, (9) a public defender, or (10) a law 
professor; and (11) tier of law school attended. Finally, we also include an additional control 
in the analysis—CD Rep. Pres. Vote Share—which is district-level 2008 Republican 
presidential vote share and serves as a proxy to control for how conservative (or liberal) a 
particular jurisdiction where the lawyer lives happens to be. 
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For each variable, the dots represent the point estimates from the regression (that is, the 
coefficients), and the lines represent the 95% confidence interval. When a dot is to the left of 
the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is associated with lawyers being more liberal 
on average; when a dot is to the right of the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is 
associated with lawyers being more conservative on average. All of the estimates are precisely 
estimated and are statistically significant at the 0.00001 level (due in part to the large sample 
size), meaning that the null hypothesis of no relationship is rejected for all of the variables. 
The results in Figure 3 reveal substantive, meaningful differences even within the attorney 
pool. For example, several groups are significantly more liberal than the average attorney. 
First, we see the clear pattern that women are more liberal than men (even when controlling 
for a number of other salient characteristics like years since bar passage and type of legal 
employment). This is consistent with the more general observation that women in America are 
on average more liberal than men. Second, government lawyers are more liberal than non-
government lawyers. This difference is comparable in magnitude to the difference found for 
gender and is consistent with expectations that government service attracts those who are 
more sympathetic with the reaches and aims of government. Third, law professor are more 
liberal than the attorney population. This effect is slightly smaller in magnitude than gender or 
government service but fully consistent with earlier studies on the topic (Chilton and Posner 
2015; McGinnis et al. 2005). Additionally, public defenders are more liberal than other 
attorneys. 
On the other hand, several traits are associated with attorneys being significantly more 
conservative. For example, the number of years since being admitted to the bar appears to 
have a strong conservative pull on attorneys. We also see more conservative individuals being 
drawn to a career at a Big Law firm (although the effect is small compared to other effects). 
Further, being a law firm partner is associated with being more conservative. This comports 
with what we see for age, which is that, as people advance in their careers, they tend to be 
more and more conservative. 
In terms of education, the patterns are a bit more mixed and implicate our next topic, 
geography. Figure 3 suggests that attending a Top 14 law school is associated with an 
individual being more liberal and attending a law school ranked outside of the top 100 is 
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associated with an individual being more conservative. However, geography could play an 
important role with regard to law schools, with some states’ law schools being more 
conservative and other states’ law schools being more liberal. 
To assess this, we include district-level 2008 Republican presidential vote share in the 
analysis. This variable serves to control for how conservative (or liberal) a particular 
jurisdiction happens to be. Including how conservative a potential district is changes the sign 
on some of the variables in important ways. This is most apparent for Big Law attorneys, who 
cluster in democratic strongholds like Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New York City, and 
San Francisco. Once we condition on how liberal the district is, however, it becomes clear that 
Big Law attorneys are actually more conservative than those around them, rather than more 
liberal. 
 
IV. IDEOLOGY BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
 
Our regressions results revealed that the congressional district where an attorney lives is 
an extremely important predictor of that lawyer’s ideology. This suggests that there is 
important geographic heterogeneity in the ideology of lawyers, and perhaps that the liberal 
leaning of American lawyers can be explained in part by where they live. In fact, 65 percent 
of Big Law attorneys and 44 percent of graduates of elite law schools are located in a select 
group of ten congressional districts with Democratic presidential vote shares ranging from 74 
to 89 percent.13 We explore how the ideology of American lawyers varies by geographic 
location in two ways. First, we examine the ideology of lawyers by state. Second, we examine 
the ideology of lawyers in major legal markets.  
 
A. Ideology by State 
 
We begin by examining how lawyers’ ideological distributions vary from state to state. A 
graphical representation of our analysis is presented in Figure 4. All fifty states—as well as 
the District of Columbia—are presented in alphabetical order. 
 
 
                                                
13 Those ten congressional districts are DC-01, NY-14, IL-7, NY-08, CA-34, CA-08, GA-05, PA-02, MA-
08, and CA-14. 
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Figure 4: Lawyers’ Ideology by State 
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The plots in Figure 4 demonstrate some substantial geographic sorting, one that belies the 
idea that the legal profession is a monolithic liberal group. Indeed, we see that lawyers skew 
strongly to the left in a number of states. For example, in California, the District of Columbia, 
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Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York, the bulk of the ideological distribution lies 
substantially to the left of the CFscore scale. In addition to these states that are associated 
with liberal political leanings, there are a few states where the left-leaning tendencies are 
perhaps surprising. These include a number of Western states, such as Alaska, Colorado, and 
New Mexico. In these states, as in California or New York, the bulk of the ideological mass 
lies to the left of center. This perhaps suggests a more liberal role of the bar in those states. 
However, the more interesting patterns develop elsewhere, particularly in states where the 
bar is actually quite conservative. In states such as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South 
Carolina, and Texas, the average lawyer is conservative. In some states, such as South Dakota, 
the pattern is quite extreme. In these states, the mass of the ideological distribution lies to the 
right, with fairly little variance in some cases (for example, in Oklahoma). These are 
conservative states to begin with, and the data suggests that the bar might be quite reflective 
of the general ideological distribution of the state of origin. 
We also note a handful of states that display genuinely bimodal ideological distributions. 
Consider, for example, Arizona. Arizona displays a classic bimodal distribution, with 
approximately half of the “mass” (e.g., number of observations) over the liberal center and the 
other half over the conservative center. The same bimodal distribution is also seen in Ohio 
and Virginia. Interestingly, these are also states that are considered to be solidly bellwether 
states in terms of Congressional and Presidential elections. The bars in these states, which are 
ideologically mixed and bimodal, appear to reflect these patterns. 
We also note one further pattern, which are the handful of states that appear to conform to 
a more traditional unimodal ideological distribution. These include Florida, West Virginia 
(slightly to the left), and possibly Oklahoma (slightly to the right). 
 
B. Ideology by Major Legal Market 
 
In addition to examining the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by state, we also examined 
the distributions by major legal market. We constructed geo-coordinates based on addresses in 
the Martindale-Hubbell directory. We then mapped the geo-coordinates onto the Current 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), which are census-defined geographic regions based on 
urban areas with populations of at least 10,000. 
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Figure 5: Lawyers’ Ideology by Major Legal Markets 
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Figure 5 reports the ideological distributions of the eight largest legal markets based on 
the number of attorneys present in our database. In descending order based on the number of 
  
27 
lawyers in our database, those eight legal markets are New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; 
Washington, D.C.; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA; San Francisco, CA; Atlanta, GA; and 
Philadelphia, PA. To be clear, we define legal markets by metropolitan regions and not city 
limits. This means that, for example, lawyers who work in Cambridge, MA, are included as 
part of the Boston legal market. 
The most important thing worth noting about the data displayed in Figure 5 is that, of the 
eight largest legal markets, seven have distributions that skew to the left. The sole exception is 
Atlanta, GA. In fact, of the top 25 largest legal markets in the U.S., only three have more 
conservative lawyers than liberal lawyers. Those three markets are: Atlanta, GA; Dallas, TX; 
and Phoenix, AZ. 
 
V. IDEOLOGY BY EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
We also examined the ideology of American lawyers by their educational experience. 
First, we explore the ideology of lawyers who graduated from elite law schools. Second, we 
expand our analysis and present the ideology of lawyers who graduated from 50 prominent 
law schools. Third, we examine the ideology of American lawyers based on the undergraduate 
institutions from which they graduated. 
 
A. Ideology of Elite Law Schools 
 
To explore the patterns of lawyers’ ideology by educational experience, we first 
disaggregate the data by the law school that each attorney attended.14 This information is 
identified on all Martindale-Hubbell entries. As there are more than 200 accredited U.S. law 
schools, we begin by limiting our analysis to “elite” law schools. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 A complete list of the mean CFscores of the 200 law schools with the largest number of alumni included 
in our database is presented in APPENDIX A. These are based on self-reported names of law schools in the 
Martin-Dale Hubbell Directory. While compiling APPENDIX A, we excluded cases where there was ambiguity 
about the identity of the law schools.  
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Figure 6: Ideology of Alumni from the Top 14 Law Schools 
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Figure 6 presents the ideological distributions for the top 14 (T-14) law schools based on 
the 2015 U.S. News and World Report rankings.15 Those law schools (in order of their 
ranking) are: (1) Yale Law School; (2) Harvard Law School; (3) Stanford Law School; (4) 
Columbia Law School; (4) University of Chicago Law School; (6) New York University 
School of Law; (7) University of Pennsylvania Law School; (8) University of Virginia School 
of Law; (9) University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; (10) Duke 
University School of Law; (10) University of Michigan Law School; (12) Northwestern 
University School of Law; (13) Cornell Law School; and (13) Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
The analyses in Figure 6 are again presented as frequency counts, meaning that some law 
schools have more graduates than others, and this is reflected in the heights of the various 
plots (compared against each other). Importantly, these represent all the graduates of the 
various law schools who are in both the Martindale-Hubbell directory and the DIME database. 
As a result, to our knowledge, Figure 6 is the most comprehensive representation of the 
ideology of elite law schools that has ever been compiled. 
The most striking result in Figure 6 is that all 14 top law schools have distributions that 
lean to the left. That is, there are more liberal alumni from those schools than there are 
conservative alumni. Not only do all of the schools lean to the left, the skew is fairly extreme 
in several of the schools. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the University of California, Berkeley has 
the most liberal leaning distribution of alumni of all the elite law schools. That said, although 
the ideology of Berkeley graduates skews the furthest to the left, it is obviously not the only 
school with a heavily left skewed distribution. In fact, all of the top six law schools—Yale, 
Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, Chicago, and NYU—have a relatively small number of 
graduates with conservative CFscores. 
Of course, there are a few schools with a sizeable percentage of their graduates with 
conservative CFscores. Both the University of Virginia School of Law and Duke University 
School of Law have a sizeable number of conservative alumni. To be exact, 37% of UVA law 
                                                
15 The “Top-14” is a commonly used definition of “elite” law schools. Although the rankings have changed, 
the same 14 schools have occupied the top 14 spots every year since the U.S. News and World Report started 
ranked law schools in 1987. See Law School Rankings, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_school_rankings_in_the_United_States#Schools_that_rank_in_the_top_14_.28
aka_.22T14.22.29 (last visited August 7, 2014). 
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alumni have conservative CFscores, and 35% of Duke Law alumni have conservative 
CFscores. The fact that these two schools have the largest percentage of alumni with 
conservative CFscores is perhaps predictable: UVA and Duke are the only top 14 law schools 
that are located in states—Virginia and North Carolina respectively—that have voted for 
Republican presidential candidates in the last decade (although Obama did narrowly win both 
states in 2008 and won Virginia in 2012). Finally, although the University of Michigan Law 
School certainly leans to the left, it does have a bimodal distribution that reveals a sizable 
number of conservative alumni. 
 
B. Ideology of Prominent Law Schools 
 
Of course, there are interesting patterns in ideology outside of the top 14 ranked law 
schools. In Figure 7, we expanded our analysis to the 50 schools with the most alumni in our 
database of political donors. The additional law schools in Figure 7 include many state 
flagship law schools and other well-known law schools. We have plotted the schools from 
most liberal (UC-Berkeley) to the most conservative (University of Alabama). 
The more liberal schools are comprised of several of the top ranked (T-14) law schools 
that were presented in Figure 6. These include UC-Berkeley, NYU, Yale, Stanford, Harvard, 
Chicago, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, and Georgetown University. This 
suggests that many of the elite law schools are more liberal than law schools on average. Of 
course, as previously noted, many elite law schools are located in exceptionally liberal 
locations—like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago—and their graduates largely 
work in those same locations after graduating, so it should perhaps not be surprising that these 
schools also have the most liberal alumni. 
The most conservative law schools are predominately located in the South. The two most 
conservative law schools in Figure 7—Cumberland School of Law and the University of 
Alabama—are both located in Alabama. Schools from South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia 
round out the top five most conservative schools. 
Although most of the prominent law schools shown in Figure 7 skew to either the left or to 
the right, there are a few law schools with notably bimodal distributions. For example, the 
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a near perfectly bimodal distribution with 
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both center-left and center-right peaks. This perhaps reflects the state of Ohio’s status as an 
evenly divided swing state in the past several presidential elections. 
 
Figure 7: Ideology of Alumni from 50 Prominent Law Schools 
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C. Ideology of Undergraduate Institutions 
 
Figure 8: Ideology of Lawyers by Their Undergraduate Institutions 
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The Martindale-Hubbell directory also lists where all of the attorneys in their directory 
received their undergraduate degree. In Figure 8, we present the distributions of lawyers’ 
ideology disaggregated by undergraduate institution attended. We specifically provide data on 
the 50 institutions that appear most commonly in our dataset. These institutions are then 
ordered in Figure 8 from most liberal (Harvard University) to most conservative (University 
of Texas). 
Of the fifty institutions shown in Figure 8, only five have an average CFscore that is 
conservative: University of Oklahoma, Texas A&M University, University of Georgia, 
Louisiana State University, and Brigham Young University. All of the other schools have both 
average liberal CFscores and median liberal CFscores. There are, however, a number of 
schools with a sizable percentage of their graduates that have conservative CFscores. These 
schools include Michigan State University, University of Notre Dame, University of Florida, 
Indiana University, and Ohio State University. 
Another interesting pattern is that the four most liberal universities on this list are also 
some of the traditionally highest ranked undergraduate institutions: Harvard, Stanford, 
Cornell, and Yale. In other words, regardless of what law school they attended, lawyers who 
attended these undergraduate institutions are much more liberal than conservative on balance. 
 
VI. IDEOLOGY BY LAW FIRMS 
 
We now turn to examining the heterogeneity of lawyers’ ideology by the law firms at 
which they work. Perhaps unlike firms in other professions, law firms are often perceived to 
be liberal or conservative. These perceptions emerge both from the clients and cases that firms 
take on as well as from the political affiliations of the firms’ high-profile attorneys. As a 
result, one incredibly useful outcome from our efforts to combine the DIME dataset of 
political ideologies with the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers is that it allows us to 
generate rigorous estimates of the ideologies of major law firms in the U.S. 
We use our data to explore the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by the law firms they 
work at in three ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers by the size of the law firm at 
which they work. Second we examine the ideology of specific law firms. Third, we 
investigate the differences in ideology between associates and partners at major law firms. 
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A. Ideology by Firm Size 
 
Figure 8 presents the ideology of lawyers based on the size of the law firm at which they 
work. The figure is broken into five categories. The first three categories are all attorneys who 
work in “Big Law”16: attorneys who work at one of the 25 largest law firms in the U.S., 
attorneys who work at law firms that are 26th through 100th in size, and attorneys who work at 
law firms that are 101 through 200th in size. The fourth category shown is lawyers who work 
in small practices.17 The final category shown is lawyers who work in solo-practices.18 
The first thing to note is that, like the population of lawyers overall, all five categories 
have liberal-leaning distributions. The most liberal leaning of the five categories is the first: 
attorneys who work at one of the 25 largest law firms. Attorneys in this category have a mean 
CFscore of -0.49 and a median CFscore of -0.74. It is worth mentioning that of these 25 law 
firms, 22 are headquartered in states where Obama won in the 2012 presidential election.19 
The second most liberal category is attorneys who work at the 26th through 100th largest 
firms. In fact, attorneys who work at these firms have a nearly identical distribution of 
ideologies to attorneys who work at the 25 largest law firms. The mean CFscore for attorneys 
who work at the 26th through 100th largest firm is -0.45, and the median CFscore is -0.68. 
Attorneys who work at the 101st through 200th largest law firms still lean to the left, but 
the distribution is closer to bimodal. The mean CFscore for these attorneys is -0.27, and the 
median CFscore is -0.47. Moreover, while the top 25 largest law firms are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in large, liberal cities like New York and Chicago, the 101st through 200th largest 
law firms have headquarters spread across the country in both liberal and conservative cities. 
Finally, attorneys who work in small practices or have solo-practices have fairly similar 
ideological distributions. Both lean to the left but also have a number of attorneys with center-
right CFscores. The mean CFscore for attorneys in small practices is -0.29, and the median 
                                                
16 Law firms are ranked by the number of attorneys who list the firm as their employer in the Martindale-
Hubbell directory. The rankings are consistent with other rankings of the largest U.S. law firms based on the 
number of employees. See for example, Internet Legal Research Group, America’s Largest 250 Law Firms, 
available at http://www.ilrg.com/nlj250 (last visited February 17, 2015). 
17 Small practices are defined as private law practices where two or more lawyers list as an employer but are 
not large enough to be included in our list of the 350 largest law firms. 
18 Solo practices are identified as law practices that are listed as employers for no more than one lawyer in 
the database. 
19 The three firms headquartered in states that Obama did not win in 2012 are Bryan Cave (St. Louis, MO), 
King & Spalding (Atlanta, GA), and Vinson & Elkins (Houston, TX). 
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CFscore is -0.49. The mean CFscore for attorneys in solo practices is -0.30, and the median 
CFscore is -0.51. 
 
Figure 9: Ideology of Lawyers by Law Firm Size 
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B. Ideology of Specific Firms 
 
To further explore the ideology of attorneys working in private practices, we examined the 
ideological breakdown of American lawyers by specific law firms. The Martindale-Hubbell 
directory includes the law firm that lawyers listed within their directory listing. This then 
allows us to estimate the ideology of specific law firms by aggregating the CFscores for all of 
the attorneys who have made political donations who work at that firm. 
There are, however, a few caveats that should be noted. First, the ideology of specific law 
firms that we report on are the mean CFscores for all attorneys listed as working at that firm 
by the Martindale-Hubbell database when we compiled our dataset.20 This means that the 
ideology score for each law firm is based on the CFscore for attorneys who worked at that law 
firm at that specific point in time. Second, the ideology reported for each firm is the mean 
CFscore for all attorneys who work at that firm. We do not weigh the relative seniority of the 
attorneys in any way, which means that 100 associates are counted the same as 100 partners in 
determining a firm’s ideological ranking. Finally, the ideology score we present does not 
represent the official ideology of the firm, or the ideology of clients that they represent. It is 
possible that a firm could appear as having a liberal ideology based on our rankings due to a 
large number of liberal associates despite having conservative firm leadership and a 
conservative client base. 
With those caveats in mind, we turn to presenting the ideology ratings of major law firms 
within the U.S. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive ideological picture of 
American law firms ever developed. In APPENDIX B, we present the mean CFscore for all of 
the 350 law firms with the most attorneys in our dataset.21 In the following tables, however, 
we present the results for four groups of firms that may be of particular interest: (1) the 20 
most prestigious firms; (2) the 20 largest firms; (3) the 20 most liberal firms; and (4) the 20 
most conservative firms. 
 
 
                                                
20 The data we use from the Martindale-Hubbell directory is based on the information listed in the directory 
for 2012. 
21 This means that our list is not identical to a ranking of the 350 largest law firms by either total attorneys or 
total revenue. Instead, our list is the 350 law firms that have the most attorneys who appear in both the DIME 
database and the Martindale-Hubbell directory. 
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1. The 20 Most Prestigious Law Firms. Table 1 presents the results for the firms that Vault 
ranked as the 20 most prestigious law firms in the U.S. for 2015. Each year Vault releases 
rankings of law firms based on surveys of attorneys who work at firms that have been highly 
ranked in previous years. For the 2015 edition of the rankings, over 17,000 attorneys 
participated in Vault’s anonymous survey.22 Although the Vault rankings have been criticized, 
they are wildly viewed and discussed by both the popular press and legal scholars (see, e.g., 
Aronson 2007; Ciolli 2005; Estlund 2011). 
As Table 1 shows, all 20 of the law firms ranked as being the most prestigious by Vault 
have a mean CFscore that is liberal. The most liberal of these 20 firms is Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart & Sullivan, which has a mean CFscore of -0.953. This is roughly comparable to the 
CFscore of Hilary Clinton (-1.16). This perhaps comports with the popular perception of 
Quinn Emanuel—the firm is known for having a unique culture that embraces wearing flip 
flops and working remotely from around the world. 
The most conservative law firm in Table 1 is Jones Day, with a CFscore of -0.213. Even 
though this is the most conservative CFscore of the Vault Top 20 most prestigious firms, it is 
still a (slightly) liberal score that is roughly comparable to that of Democratic West Virginia 
Senator Joe Manchin (-0.13). Although Jones Day is listed as having its largest office in New 
York, Jones Day officially does not have a headquarters. The firm’s moderate ideology can 
perhaps be in part explained by the fact that Jones Day was founded in Cleveland, and the 
firm maintains a strong presence there, as well as having offices in many traditionally 
moderate and conservative states. 
It is worth noting that all 20 of these prestigious law firms have their largest offices in one 
of four cities: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington, D.C. In fact, the largest 
office of 15 of the 20 prestigious law firms is located in New York. Given the fact that all four 
cities are overwhelmingly Democratic, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that these firms all have 
liberal average CFscores as well. 
 
 
 
                                                
22 For more on the methodology that Vault uses to rank law firms, see http://www.vault.com/company-
rankings/law/vault-law-100//RankMethodology?sRankID=2&rYear=2015&pg=1 (last visited January 19, 2015). 
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Table 1: Ideology of the “Vault” Top 20 Law Firms 
 Lam Firm Largest Office Ideology 
1 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz New York  -0.478 
2 Cravath, Swaine & Moore New York  -0.684 
3 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom New York  -0.629 
4 Sullivan & Cromwell New York -0.492 
5 Davis Polk & Wardwell New York -0.601 
6 Simpson Thacher & Bartlett New York -0.719 
7 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton New York -0.940 
8 Weil, Gotshal & Manges New York -0.534 
9 Kirkland & Ellis Chicago -0.363 
10 Latham & Watkins New York -0.561 
11 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Los Angeles -0.297 
12 Covington & Burling Washington, D.C. -0.612 
13 Boies, Schiller & Flexner New York -0.783 
14 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison New York -0.764 
15 Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan New York -0.953 
16 Debevoise & Plimpton New York -0.815 
17 Sidley Austin Chicago -0.608 
18 Williams & Connolly Washington, D.C. -0.735 
19 Jones Day New York -0.213 
20 White & Case New York -0.494 
 
2. The 20 Largest Law Firms. In addition to analyzing the most prestigious law firms, we 
also analyzed the data for the largest law firms. To identify the largest law firms, we relied on 
the list of the largest U.S. Law Firms published in 2014 by Law360.23 To be included in the 
list, the law firms must be based in the U.S. The rankings are based on the total number of 
attorneys working for the firm within the U.S., and the number of attorneys are taken from 
either the firms’ websites or the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Table 2 presents the mean 
CFscores for the 20 largest U.S. law firms according to Law360. 
 
 
 
                                                
23 See Jake Simpson, Law360 Reveals 400 Largest US Law Firms, LAW360, March 23, 2014, available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/518950/law360-reveals-400-largest-us-law-firms (last visited January 19, 2015). 
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Table 2: Ideology of the 20 Largest Law Firms 
 Lam Firm Largest Office Ideology 
1 Jones Day New York  -0.213 
2 Greenberg Traurig New York  -0.426 
3 Sidley Austin Chicago  -0.608 
4 Latham & Watkins New York -0.561 
5 Kirkland & Ellis Chicago -0.363 
6 DLA Piper Chicago -0.674 
7 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom New York -0.629 
8 K&L Gates Pittsburgh -0.562 
9 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Philadelphia -0.385 
10 Reed Smith Pittsburgh -0.443 
11 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Los Angeles -0.297 
12 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Washington, D.C. -0.837 
13 Holland & Knight Tampa -0.382 
14 Bryan Cave St. Louis -0.331 
15 Hogan Lovells Washington, D.C. -0.585 
16 Littler Mendelson San Francisco -0.502 
17 Perkins Coie Seattle -0.675 
18 Ropes & Gray Boston -0.711 
19 McGuireWoods Richmond -0.225 
20 Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith Los Angeles -0.417 
 
Although there is some overlap, 14 of the firms in Table 2 did not appear in the list of the 
20 most prestigious firms listed in Table 1. The lists are similar in one important respect 
though: all have a liberal mean CFscore. With a score of -0.837, Wilmer Cutler Pickering 
Hale and Dorr is the most liberal firm on the list. Once again, Jones Day is the most 
conservative firm on the list with a score of -0.213. 
It is also worth noting that the firms represented in Table 2 are from a more diverse set of 
cities than the firms listed in Table 1. In fact, the firms in Table 2 have their largest offices in 
12 different cities. That said, although these cities are more diverse, Obama won the states in 
which all 12 cities are located in the 2012 presidential election. 
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3. The 20 Most Liberal Law Firms. Table 3 presents the results for the 20 law firms that 
have the most liberal mean CFscores. To be clear, these 20 firms are not necessarily the 20 
most liberal in the country. Instead, of the 350 firms that have the most attorneys in our 
database, these 20 have the most liberal CFscores. 
 
Table 3: Ideology of the 20 Most Liberal Law Firms 
 Lam Firm Largest Office Ideology 
1 BuckleySandler Washington, D.C.  -1.193 
2 Farella Braun + Martel San Francisco  -1.076 
3 Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan New York  -0.953 
4 Morrison & Foerster San Francisco -0.943 
5 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton New York -0.940 
6 Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd San Diego -0.939 
7 Hanson Bridgett San Francisco -0.937 
8 Fenwick & West Mountain View -0.92 
9 Goulston & Storrs Boston -0.919 
10 Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney Chicago -0.917 
11 Davis & Gilbert New York -0.897 
12 Wiggin and Dana New Haven -0.885 
13 Munger, Tolles & Olson Los Angeles -0.881 
14 Arnold & Porter Washington, D.C. -0.868 
15 Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe San Francisco -0.853 
16 Kenyon & Kenyon New York -0.853 
17 Schiff Hardin Chicago -0.839 
18 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Washington, D.C. -0.837 
19 Leonard, Street and Deinard Minneapolis -0.824 
20 Foley Hoag Boston -0.819 
 
Of these 20 firms, only three appear in Table 1 or Table 2: Quinn Emanuel and Cleary 
Gottlieb appeared in the list of the 20 most prestigious firms presented in Table 1, and Wilmer 
Hale appeared in the list of the 20 largest law firms presented in Table 2. The most liberal 
firm in Table 3 is BuckleySandler. With a mean CFscore of -1.193, BuckleySandler has a 
similar ideology score to Hillary Clinton (who has a CFscore of -1.16). The twentieth most 
liberal firm in the list is Foley Hoag. With a mean CFscore of -0.819, Foley Hoag has a 
similar ideology score to Bill Clinton (who has a CFscore of -0.68). 
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4. The 20 Most Conservative Law Firms. Table 4 presents the results for the 20 law firms 
that have the most conservative mean CFscores. Once again, just like with the liberal firms, 
these are the 20 firms that have the most conservative CFscores of the 350 firms that have the 
most attorneys in our database. 
 
Table 4: Ideology of the 20 Most Conservative Law Firms 
 Lam Firm Largest Office Ideology 
1 Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada Ridgeland (MS)  0.943 
2 Warner Norcross & Judd Grand Rapids (MI)  0.658 
3 Balch & Bingham Birmingham (AL)  0.572 
4 Kirton McConkie Salt Lake City 0.508 
5 Burleson Houston 0.467 
6 Phelps Dunbar New Orleans 0.452 
7 Varnum Grand Rapids (MI) 0.449 
8 McAfee & Taft Oklahoma City 0.447 
9 Krieg DeVault Indianapolis 0.446 
10 Cox Smith Matthews San Antonio 0.435 
11 Jones, Walker, Waechter New Orleans 0.423 
12 Kelly Hart & Hallman Fort Worth 0.422 
13 Hall Booth Smith & Slover Atlanta 0.400 
14 Miller & Martin Chattanooga 0.387 
15 Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz Memphis 0.365 
16 McDonald Hopkins Cleveland 0.364 
17 Jackson Walker Dallas 0.340 
18 Winstead Dallas 0.326 
19 Ryley Carlock & Applewhite Phoenix 0.320 
20 Taft, Stettinius & Hollister Cincinnati 0.310 
 
None of the 20 firms listed in Table 4 appeared in the list of the most prestigious firms in 
Table 1 or the largest firms in Table 2. Additionally, these firms are from a different set of 
cities than the firms from Tables 1, 2, and 3. The firms in Table 4 are overwhelmingly from 
states that Obama lost in the 2012 presidential election. The four exceptions are the two firms 
located in Michigan (#2 Warner Norcross & Judd and #7 Varnum) and the two firms located 
in Ohio (#16 McDonald Hopkins and #20 Taft, Stettinius & Hollister). 
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It is also worth noting that the most conservative firm in Table 4—Butler, Snow, O’Mara, 
Stevens & Cannada—has a less extreme average CFscore than the three most liberal firms 
presented in Table 3. Additionally, the twentieth most conservative firm in Table 4—Taft, 
Stettinius & Hollister—has a much more moderate CFscore than the twentieth most liberal 
firm in Table 3. In fact, with a mean CFscore of 0.31, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister has a mean 
ideology comparable to that of centrist Republican Senator Olympia Snowe from Maine 
(0.29). 
 
C. Ideology of Partners v. Associates 
 
Of course, not all of the attorneys who work at a given law firm have ideologies that 
match the firm average. In fact, within many of the firms there are likely to be cleavages along 
a number of key dimensions. One key dimension we further explore in this section is the 
ideology of law firm associates compared to law firm partners. Figure 10 shows the 
disaggregated average ideology for associates and partners at 30 major law firms.24 
There are three patterns worth noting in Figure 10. First, at all 30 of these law firms, the 
partners are more conservative than the associates on average. This can likely be explained at 
least in part by the fact that partners are more likely to be older, richer, male, and white than 
the associates at their firms. All four of these characteristics are associated with conservative 
political leanings. 
Second, the differences between the average CFscores for associates and partners at these 
30 law firms are relatively small. There are several possible explanations for this 
phenomenon. First, law students may choose to go work for law firms where the partners’ 
political leanings are close to their own. Second, law firms extend offers to law students who 
they believe share their views (either based on the activities listed on their resumes or the 
views the student expressed during interviews). Third, new associates may adopt the views of 
other attorneys at their law firm over time. Fourth, both partners and associates have political 
ideologies that reflect the cities where they live—either because of selection bias or 
                                                
24 The firms studied are the 30 firms that have the most lawyers included in our database. There are two 
reasons for focusing on the firms with the largest number of lawyers in our database. First, our estimates are 
likely to be more reliable when they are based on a larger number of observations. Second, firms with larger 
numbers of attorneys in our database are also well known firms that are likely to be of interest to readers. 
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acculturation—and that associates and partners in the same city are likely to share similar 
views. We believe that all four of these explanations are plausible and not mutually exclusive. 
 
Figure 10: Ideology of Associates Compared to Partners 
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
WilmerHale
Vinson & Elkins
Thompson Coburn
Squire Sanders
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Sidley Austin
Seyfarth Shaw
Ropes & Gray
Reed Smith
Pillsbury
Perkins Coie
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
McDermott Will & Emery
Latham & Watkins
Kirkland & Ellis
Katten Muchin Rosenman
K&L Gates
Holland & Knight
Hogan Lovells
Goodwin Procter
Fulbright & Jaworski
Fox Rothschild
DLA Piper
Davis Wright Tremaine
Bryan Cave
Ballard Spahr
Baker Botts
Baker & Hostetler
Akin Gump
−1.0 −0.5 0.0
CFscore (Conservatism)
●
●
Partners
Associates
 
 
 
  
44 
Third, very few of these firms have conservative partners or associates. There are only 
three firms where the partners have an average CFscore that is conservative. Those firms are 
Baker Botts, Fullbright & Jaworski, and Vinson & Elkins. Notably, all three firms are based in 
Houston, Texas. Moreover, there are only two firms where the average CFscore for associates 
is conservative: Baker Botts and Vinson & Elkins. Even though these firms are conservative 
on average, their CFscores are still fairly moderate. To put things in perspective, there are 
eleven firms whose partners have an average CFscore more liberal than -0.50, but not a single 
one of these firms has a CFscore more conservative than 0.50. 
 
VII. IDEOLOGY BY PRACTICE AREA 
 
There are likely considerable differences in the ideologies of lawyers based on the type of 
law that they practice. For example, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that, on average, 
lawyers who specialize in mergers and acquisitions have different political views than lawyers 
who specialize in immigration law. We explore the ideological distributions of lawyers based 
on the kind of law they practice in two ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers based 
on the area of law they claim to specialize. Second, we examine the ideology of lawyers who 
work as public defenders and prosecutors. 
 
A. Ideology by Practice Area Overall 
 
We begin by examining the ideology of lawyers based on their practice area. To do so, we 
rely on the practice areas that are listed on attorneys’ profiles in the Martindale-Hubbell 
directory. It is important to note that some lawyers in the directory do not have any practice 
areas listed while other lawyers in the directory have several listed. Moreover, the available 
categories may not be consistently used. For example, even if two lawyers both work on the 
same deals, the practice area for one attorney may be listed as “Mergers & Acquisitions” 
while another may be listed as “Corporate Law.” Finally, it may be the case that missing 
practice area information is not random. In other words, our data on practice areas may be 
biased because this information may not be equally likely to be available for all attorneys. 
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Figure 11: Ideology of Lawyers by Practice Area  
OLS, CFscore as outcome variable
Bars denote CIs.
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With these caveats in mind, examining the relationship between practice area and lawyers’ 
ideology can still reveal interesting—although imperfect—information. Figure 11 presents the 
regression results that estimate the CFscores of lawyers while including variables for the 48 
practice areas that appear most commonly in the Martindale-Hubbell database. In addition to 
the variables for practice areas, the regression also includes all of the variables included in the 
regression presented in Figure 3 as controls. As with Figure 3, the regression results presented 
in Figure 11 are presented graphically—the dots for each variable are the point estimates and 
the line is the 95% confidence interval. Variables where the confidence interval does not cross 
the vertical line are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Estimates to the left of the 
vertical line mean that the variable is associated with more liberal CFscores, and estimates to 
the right of the vertical line mean that the variable is associated with more conservative 
CFscores. 
It is important to note, however, that Figure 11 reports regression results that control for a 
number of key characteristics of the lawyers included in the regression. In other words, a 
practice area with a negative (positive) coefficient means that lawyers with that practice area 
listed on the Martindale-Hubbell directory are likely to be more liberal (conservative) than a 
similarly situated lawyer who practices in another area. What it does not mean is that that the 
lawyers working in that practice area are all liberal (conservative). 
In Figure 11, the 48 practice areas included in the regression are listed from most 
conservative to most liberal. Seventeen of the practice areas are associated with more 
conservative CFscores in a statistically significant way. The most conservative of which is oil 
& gas law. Additionally, sixteen of the practice areas are associated with more liberal 
CFscores in a statistically significant way. The practice that predicts the most liberal CFscore 
is entertainment law. 
 
B. Ideology of Prosecutors v. Defense Attorneys 
 
As a final examination of the ideology of American lawyers, we explored the political 
leanings of individuals who are either public defenders or prosecutors. To do so, we subset 
our database based on how the lawyers identified their title or employer. Public defenders 
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were identified as anyone who listed their profession as being a “defender.”25 Prosecutors 
were identified as anyone who listed their profession as being related to a district attorney, 
state’s attorney, or attorney general.26 Although this process is not perfect, it did produce a 
sample of over 1,300 public defenders and a sample of over 6,000 prosecutors. The ideologies 
of these two groups of attorneys are reported in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Ideology of Public Defenders & Prosecutors 
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There are several things worth noting about the patterns revealed in Figure 12. First, 
unsurprisingly, public defenders lean far to the left. The mean CFscore for public defenders is 
roughly -1.00, which is comparable to that of Hillary Clinton’s CFscore. Additionally, there 
are many public defenders who have views that are on the extreme end of the distribution. In 
fact, the modal CFscore for public defenders is greater than -1.5 (roughly comparable to the 
ideology of liberal congressman Alan Grayson). That said, there are some conservative public 
defenders. To be exact, roughly 17.5% of public defenders in our dataset have CFscores that 
                                                
25 To be more precise, we searched our combined dataset for the following phrases: “Defenders A”, “Fed. 
Def”, “Capital Def”, “Federal Defenders”, “Defender”, or “Capital Def”. 
26 We specifically searched our data for the following terms: “Atty. Gen.”, “Dist. Atty.”, “Asst. Atty. Gen.”, 
“Atty. General”, “State Atty. Off.”, “Asst. State Atty.”, “Co. Atty’s. Off.”, “Atty. Gen.”, or “State’s Atty.”. 
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are to the right of center. Although there are very few conservative public defenders, the fact 
that it is not a null set may be surprising to some readers. 
Second, although they do not lean as far to the left as public defenders, prosecutors are 
still liberal. In fact, prosecutors are more liberal than lawyers overall. The mean CFscore for 
prosecutors is roughly -0.50. This is slightly to the left of lawyers overall (-0.31), which is 
perhaps surprising given the contrast that is often drawn between public defenders being 
liberal and prosecutors being conservative (see, e.g., Folsom 2013; Smolla 2005). This 
complicates any narrative that suggests that conservatives are drawn to prosecution while 
liberals are drawn to public defense. It is also worth noting that the ideological distribution of 
prosecutors is closer to being bimodal. In fact, 34% of prosecutors have CFscores to the right 
of center (compared to just 17.5% of public defenders). Taken together, our data reveals that 
although public defenders are more liberal than prosecutors, both groups are still more liberal 
than lawyers overall. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude where we started, with the idea that lawyers occupy an extremely prominent 
role in American politics and society. As a result, how the bar operates—its partisan 
inclinations and ideological proclivities—is especially important. In total, lawyers control 
two-thirds of the three branches of the federal government. Understanding how this 
population as a whole behaves is not only descriptively interesting, but also illuminating in 
terms of understanding the influence wielded by this very significant group. 
In this article, we have leveraged two massive datasets to offer a comprehensive analysis 
of the ideology of American lawyers. The first dataset is the DIME database at Stanford 
University. The DIME database uses data on campaign contributions to place individuals on a 
single ideological scale. We then linked this data to the second dataset, which is the famous 
Martindale-Hubbell directory, which captures a comprehensive snapshot of the nation’s 
attorneys. Doing so enables us to explore in a systematic fashion the ideological leanings of 
nearly half a million U.S. attorneys. We do so using one consistent scale (CFscores) which 
places these attorneys on a single, ideological dimension and allows us to compare attorneys 
as a whole to other political actors, attorneys to other professions, graduates of various law 
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schools to each other, and within and across law firms. 
Using the novel dataset we created by combining the DIME database and the Martindale-
Hubbell directory, we have completed what we believe to be the most comprehensive look 
into the ideology of American lawyers ever conducted. Our results not only confirm existing 
conventional wisdoms, but also reveal heterogeneity within the profession that previously has 
gone unexplored. In short, our results reveal the political ideologies of America’s “highest 
political class” (de Tocqueville 1840, 514). 
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Appendix A: Ideology of the 200 Law Schools with Most Donors 
 
Law School  Mean 
Albany Law School -0.270 
American University -0.834 
Appalachian School of Law 0.090 
Arizona State University -0.194 
Ave Maria University 0.555 
Barry University -0.157 
Baylor University 0.040 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law -0.839 
Birmingham Law School 0.023 
Boston College -0.820 
Boston University -0.930 
Brigham Young University 0.828 
Brooklyn Law School -0.780 
California Western School of Law -0.445 
Campbell University -0.079 
Capital University -0.041 
Case Western Reserve University -0.521 
Catholic University -0.624 
Chapman University -0.159 
Charlotte School of Law -1.333 
Chicago Kent College of Law -0.712 
City University of New York -0.758 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law -0.327 
Columbia University -0.882 
Cornell University -0.785 
Creighton University -0.613 
Cumberland University 0.382 
DePaul University -0.824 
Dickinson Law -0.337 
Drake University -0.259 
Drexel University -0.402 
Duke University -0.605 
Duquesne University -0.144 
Emory University -0.556 
Florida A & M University -0.505 
Florida Coastal School of Law -0.086 
Florida State University -0.207 
Fordham University -0.773 
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Franklin Pierce Law Center -0.417 
George Mason University -0.253 
George Washington University -0.841 
Georgetown University -0.821 
Georgia State University -0.151 
Golden Gate University -0.941 
Gonzaga University -0.404 
Hamline University -0.380 
Harvard University -0.816 
Hofstra University -0.598 
Howard University -1.170 
Indiana University Bloomington -0.713 
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis -0.025 
John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, GA -0.131 
John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL -0.626 
Lewis & Clark Law School -1.048 
Louisiana State University 0.278 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles -0.400 
Loyola University -0.551 
Marquette University -0.502 
University of Massachusetts -0.717 
McGeorge School of Law -0.713 
McGill University -0.583 
Mercer University 0.137 
Michigan State University -0.178 
Mississippi College School of Law 0.192 
Nashville School of Law 0.116 
National University -0.299 
University of New England -0.558 
New York Law School -0.658 
North Carolina Central University -0.503 
Northeastern University -1.072 
Northern Illinois University -1.261 
Northwestern University -0.839 
University of Notre Dame -0.196 
Nova Southeastern University -0.224 
New York University -0.950 
Ohio Northern University 0.059 
Ohio State University -0.222 
Oklahoma City University 0.131 
Pace University -0.410 
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Pennsylvania State University -0.154 
Pepperdine University -0.308 
Quinnipiac University -0.410 
Regent University 0.264 
Roger Williams University -0.386 
Rutgers University -0.661 
Saint Louis University -0.752 
Salmon P. Chase College of Law -0.026 
San Francisco Law School -0.980 
San Joaquin College of Law -0.041 
Santa Clara University -0.816 
Seattle University -0.938 
Seton Hall University School of Law -0.467 
South Texas College of Law -0.080 
Southern Illinois University -0.634 
Southern Methodist University 0.029 
Southern University -0.377 
Southwestern Law School -0.733 
St. John’s University, Collegeville, MN -0.301 
St. John’s University, New York, NY -0.483 
St. Louis University -0.661 
St. Mary’s University School of Law 0.047 
St. Thomas University School of Law -0.147 
Stanford University -0.878 
State University of New York at Buffalo -0.413 
Stetson University 0.015 
Suffolk University -0.637 
Syracuse University -0.618 
Temple University -0.701 
Texas Tech University 0.236 
Texas Wesleyan University 0.047 
Thomas Jefferson University -0.171 
Thomas M. Cooley Law School -0.204 
Thurgood Marshall School of Law -0.962 
Touro College -0.560 
Tulane University -0.563 
University of Akron -0.123 
University of Alabama 0.066 
University of Arizona -0.776 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville -0.237 
University of Arkansas, Little Rock -0.290 
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University of Baltimore -0.519 
University of California, Berkeley -1.155 
University of California, Davis -0.812 
University of California, Los Angeles -0.941 
University of California, Hastings -1.125 
University of Chicago -0.833 
University of Cincinnati -0.226 
University of Charleston 0.333 
University of Colorado, Boulder -0.829 
University of Connecticut -0.654 
University of Dayton 0.028 
University of Denver -0.769 
University of Detroit -0.364 
University of Florida -0.214 
University of Georgia -0.185 
University of Hawaii -0.593 
University of Houston -0.149 
University of Idaho 0.212 
University of Illinois -0.865 
University of Iowa -0.688 
University of Kansas -0.391 
University of Kentucky 0.039 
University of La Verne -0.428 
University of Louisville -0.118 
University of Maine -1.013 
University of Maryland -0.768 
University of Miami -0.376 
University of Michigan -0.776 
University of Minnesota -0.907 
University of Mississippi 0.406 
University of Missouri -0.197 
University of Missouri, Kansas City -0.450 
University of Montana -0.630 
University of Nebraska -0.005 
University of New Hampshire -0.140 
University of New Mexico -0.853 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill -0.391 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro -0.552 
University of North Dakota 0.229 
University of Oklahoma 0.062 
University of Oregon -1.047 
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University of Pennsylvania -0.865 
University of Pittsburgh -0.386 
University of Richmond -0.482 
University of San Diego -0.256 
University of South Carolina 0.171 
University of South Dakota 0.061 
University of Southern California -0.851 
University of St. Thomas 0.070 
University of Tennessee, Chattanooga -0.443 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville -0.267 
University of Texas, Austin -0.165 
University of Toledo -0.052 
University of Toronto -1.006 
University of Tulsa -0.109 
University of Utah -0.487 
University of Vermont -0.758 
University of Virginia -0.719 
University of Washington -1.005 
University of West Los Angeles -0.451 
University of Wisconsin -0.843 
University of Wyoming 0.426 
Valparaiso University -0.183 
Vanderbilt University -0.556 
Villanova University -0.394 
Wake Forest University -0.349 
Washburn University -0.151 
University of Washington -0.806 
Washington and Lee University -0.401 
Washington University in St. Louis -0.738 
Wayne State University -0.311 
West Virginia University -0.204 
Western New England -0.620 
Western State University -0.308 
Whittier College -0.461 
Widener University -0.229 
Willamette University -0.571 
William & Mary -0.414 
William Mitchell College of Law -0.680 
William S. Boyd School of Law -0.332 
Yale University -0.913 
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APPENDIX B: IDEOLOGY OF 350 LARGE AMERICAN LAW FIRMS 
 
Law Firm Headquarters Mean 
Adams and Reese New Orleans 0.149 
Adelson, Testan, Brundo & Jimenez Van Nuys, CA -0.504 
Akerman Senterfitt Miami -0.18 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld Washington, D.C. -0.318 
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis Los Angeles -0.484 
Alston & Bird Atlanta -0.149 
Andrews Kurth Houston 0.216 
Archer & Greiner Haddonfield, NJ -0.439 
Arent Fox Washington, D.C. -0.509 
Armstrong Teasdale St. Louis -0.122 
Arnall Golden Gregory Atlanta 0.061 
Arnold & Porter Washington, D.C. -0.868 
Arnstein & Lehr Chicago -0.771 
Baker & Daniels Indianapolis -0.082 
Baker & Hostetler Cleveland -0.122 
Baker & McKenzie Chicago -0.429 
Baker Botts Houston 0.283 
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz Memphis 0.365 
Balch & Bingham Birmingham, AL 0.572 
Ballard Spahr Philadelphia -0.578 
Barnes & Thornburg Indianapolis 0.165 
Bass, Berry & Sims Nashville 0.035 
Becker & Poliakoff Fort Lauderdale -0.325 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff Cleveland 0.13 
Best Best & Krieger Riverside, CA -0.283 
Bingham Greenebaum Doll Indianapolis 0.229 
Bingham McCutchen Boston -0.762 
Blank Rome Philadelphia -0.157 
Bodman Detroit -0.111 
Boies, Schiller & Flexner New York -0.783 
Bond, Schoeneck & King Syracuse, NY 0.063 
Bowman and Brooke Minneapolis -0.263 
Bracewell & Giuliani Houston 0.099 
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings Birmingham, AL 0.285 
Bricker & Eckler Columbus, OH 0.093 
Briggs and Morgan Minneapolis -0.338 
Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione Chicago -0.49 
Broad and Cassel Orlando -0.222 
Brown Rudnick Boston -0.628 
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Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck Denver -0.44 
Bryan Cave St. Louis -0.331 
Buchalter Nemer Los Angeles -0.57 
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney Pittsburgh -0.203 
BuckleySandler Washington, D.C. -1.193 
Burleson Houston 0.467 
Burns & Levinson Boston -0.625 
Burr & Forman Birmingham, AL 0.215 
Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada Ridgeland, MS 0.943 
Butzel Long Detroit -0.054 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft New York -0.495 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel New York -0.458 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold Cleveland 0.143 
Carlton Fields Tampa -0.322 
Chadbourne & Parke New York -0.537 
Chapman and Cutler Chicago -0.5 
Choate, Hall & Stewart Boston -0.716 
Clark Hill Detroit -0.12 
Clausen Miller Chicago -0.316 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton New York -0.94 
Cohen & Grigsby Pittsburgh 0.084 
Cole, Scott & Kissane Miami -0.114 
Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, 
Morrow & Schefer 
Hollywood, FL -0.565 
Cooley Palo Alto -0.548 
Covington & Burling Washington, D.C. -0.612 
Cox Smith Matthews San Antonio 0.435 
Cozen O’Connor Philadelphia -0.509 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore New York -0.684 
Crowe & Dunlevy Oklahoma City 0.181 
Crowell & Moring Washington, D.C. -0.67 
Crowley Fleck Billings, MT -0.18 
Cullen and Dykman Garden City, NY -0.246 
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle New York -0.488 
Davis & Gilbert New York -0.897 
Davis Graham & Stubbs Denver -0.669 
Davis Polk & Wardwell New York -0.601 
Davis Wright Tremaine Seattle -0.646 
Day Pitney Hartford -0.564 
Debevoise & Plimpton New York -0.815 
Dechert Philadelphia -0.455 
Dewey & LeBoeuf New York -0.789 
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Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote Pittsburgh -0.053 
Dickinson Wright Detroit 0.012 
Dickstein Shapiro Washington, D.C. -0.412 
Dinsmore & Shohl Cincinnati 0.208 
DLA Piper Chicago -0.674 
Dorsey & Whitney Minneapolis -0.629 
Dow Lohnes Washington, D.C. -0.255 
Downey Brand Sacramento -0.587 
Drinker Biddle & Reath Philadelphia -0.41 
Duane Morris Philadelphia -0.326 
Dykema Gossett Chicago -0.016 
Eckert Seamans Pittsburgh -0.057 
Edwards Wildman Palmer Boston -0.685 
Epstein Becker & Green New York -0.576 
Faegre & Benson Minneapolis -0.604 
Farella Braun + Martel San Francisco -1.076 
Fennemore Craig Phoenix 0.157 
Fenwick & West Mountain View -0.92 
Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner Washington, D.C. -0.423 
Fish & Richardson Boston -0.629 
Fisher & Phillips Atlanta 0.22 
Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto New York -0.376 
Foley & Lardner Milwaukee -0.341 
Foley & Mansfield Minneapolis -0.57 
Foley Hoag Boston -0.819 
Ford & Harrison Atlanta -0.042 
Foster Pepper Seattle -0.654 
Fowler White Boggs Tampa 0.058 
Fox Rothschild Philadelphia -0.365 
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy New York -0.574 
Fredrikson & Byron Minneapolis -0.664 
Freeborn & Peters Chicago -0.139 
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson New York -0.674 
Frost Brown Todd Cincinnati 0.225 
Fulbright & Jaworski Houston 0.026 
Gardere Wynne Sewell Dallas 0.102 
Gibbons Newark, NJ -0.299 
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